# Epistemic Injustice **Domain:** Social epistemology / Institutional power **Doc Type:** Developed Concept Node **Maturity:** Developed **Collection:** [[collections/Gamification|Gamification Collection]] ## Definition **Epistemic injustice** is injustice done to someone in their capacity as a knower. Miranda Fricker's foundational account distinguishes **testimonial injustice**, in which prejudice produces an unfair credibility deficit, from **hermeneutical injustice**, in which unequal participation in shared interpretive resources leaves an experience difficult to understand or communicate. ## Significance The concept names failures that occur before a claim reaches ordinary factual adjudication. A person may possess relevant experience yet lack the recognized vocabulary, standing, audience, or institutional route needed to make it intelligible. In a gamified system, scores, labels, virality, and automated classifications can magnify those unequal conditions. Epistemic injustice is not a guarantee that a disputed belief is true. It concerns the fairness of credibility and meaning-making arrangements. Evidence evaluation and procedural repair remain necessary. ## Sources - Miranda Fricker, [*Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*](https://academic.oup.com/book/32817) - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [Epistemic Injustice](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-injustice/) ## Routes [[wiki/Testimonial Injustice|Testimonial Injustice]] · [[wiki/Epistemic Injury|Epistemic Injury]] · [[articles/The Right to Know Reality|The Right to Know Reality]] · [[wiki/Representational Due Process|Representational Due Process]]