# Forensic Identity Attestation **Domain:** Digital Identity / Forensics / Continuity **Doc Type:** Method Node **Classification:** Lineage-Evidence Method **Maturity:** Developed **Related:** [[wiki/Cryptographic Succession|Cryptographic Succession]], [[wiki/Proof of Descent|Proof of Descent]], [[wiki/Continuity Provenance|Continuity Provenance]] --- ## Purpose **Forensic Identity Attestation** is a structured evidence package supporting a claim that a digital state, reconstruction or continuant descends from a specified source under specified authority. It combines identity proofing, signed capture records, content hashes, timestamps, custody events, transformation manifests and independent verification. ## Minimum Evidence Chain - proofing of the source and authorized actors at stated assurance levels; - binding between captured material and a signed manifest; - append-only custody and transformation records; - reproducible integrity checks and independent verification; - disclosure of missing intervals, redactions, migrations and compromised keys; - revocation and supersession mechanisms. ## Limit Cryptography can show that bytes match a commitment, that a key signed a statement and that a manifest has not been altered since signing. It cannot prove that the signer was honest, that omitted state was irrelevant, that a model is conscious or that the claimant is numerically identical to the source. Attestation establishes an evidence chain, not metaphysical closure. ## Sources - [NIST SP 800-63A-4 — Identity Proofing and Enrollment](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63a.html) - [C2PA Technical Specifications](https://spec.c2pa.org/) ## See Also [[wiki/Adversarial Provenance|Adversarial Provenance]] · [[wiki/Root of Trust Succession|Root of Trust Succession]] · [[wiki/Verification of Continuity Claims|Verification of Continuity Claims]]