# Identity Is Not What Matters **Domain:** Philosophy / Personal Identity / Ethics **Doc Type:** Thesis Node **Classification:** Reductionist Continuity Thesis **Maturity:** Foundational **Related:** [[wiki/Derek Parfit|Derek Parfit]], [[wiki/Psychological Continuity|Psychological Continuity]], [[wiki/Positive Right to Continuity|Positive Right to Continuity]] --- ## Thesis **Identity Is Not What Matters** names Parfit's claim that the practical importance commonly assigned to personal identity may instead rest on psychological connectedness, continuity and causal dependence. Fission supplies the central test: both successors may preserve what the predecessor had reason to care about even though neither can be uniquely identical to that predecessor. ## What the Thesis Does Not Say The thesis does not say that copies are interchangeable, that death is harmless, or that institutions may substitute any convincing simulation for a person. Relation R can vary in strength; causal history matters; branches acquire separate experiences and interests; and ordinary rights still require determinate administration. ## Corpus Consequence Continuity architecture must not force one metaphysical predicate to do every job. It can protect psychological survival without claiming proven numerical identity, recognize descendants without erasing their distinctness and allocate successor standing without declaring that law has solved the metaphysics. ## Relationships - **Edge source route:** [[collections/Edge|Edge]] connects this topic to exact Annual Question passages promoted into the Simple Reminders archive. ## Simple Reminders, Quotations, and Thoughts > “Although the copy shares my pattern, it would be hard to say that the copy is me because I would (or could) still be here. You could even scan and copy me while I was sleeping. If you come to me in the morning and say, “Good news, Ray, we’ve successfully reinstantiated you into a more durable substrate, so we won’t be needing your old body and brain anymore,” I may beg to differ.” > **— Ray Kurzweil**, *2002, Edge Annual Question, “WHAT IS YOUR QUESTION? ... WHY?”* [[reminders/Mind Upload/A Perfect Copy of My Pattern Would Not Necessarily Be Me by Ray Kurzweil|A Perfect Copy of My Pattern Would Not Necessarily Be Me by Ray Kurzweil]] > “Will it ever be possible to download the information stored in the human brain?” > **— Mario Livio**, *2018, Edge Annual Question, “WHAT IS THE LAST QUESTION?”* [[reminders/Mind Upload/Can We Download the Information Stored in the Human Brain by Mario Livio|Can We Download the Information Stored in the Human Brain by Mario Livio]] ## Sources - Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Part III (1984). - [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Personal Identity](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/) ## See Also [[wiki/Continuity Evidence vs Continuity|Continuity Evidence vs Continuity]] · [[wiki/Fission and Fusion of Persons|Fission and Fusion of Persons]] · [[wiki/Successor Standing|Successor Standing]]