# Neurosecurity **Entity class:** Security field ## Definition **Neurosecurity** protects neural devices, neural data, decoding models, stimulation pathways, command authority, and the resulting state of the biological endpoint. In a read-only interface, the dominant problem is the confidentiality and integrity of observation. In a writable or [[wiki/Brain-Computer Interfaces|bidirectional brain-computer interface]], security also governs whether an instruction may cross from computation into neural function. ## Security boundary The protected object is the complete [[wiki/Cyber-Biological System|cyber-biological system]]: device hardware, firmware, software, communications, identity, permissions, machine-learning models, [[wiki/Neural Command Channel|neural command channel]], stimulation parameters, physiological response, and recovery state. The decisive questions are: 1. Is the device trustworthy? 2. Is the neural command channel trustworthy? 3. Has the biological endpoint remained within, or been restored to, a safe state? ## Operational architecture The mature loop is [[wiki/Continuous Vulnerability Intelligence|continuous vulnerability intelligence]] → [[wiki/Human-Machine State Estimation|continuous human-machine state estimation]] → [[wiki/Predictive Exploit Detection|predictive exploit detection]] → rapid containment → trusted remediation → [[wiki/Verified Neural Restoration|verified restoration]]. This extends vulnerability management through the implant and into the state produced at the nervous system. ## Relationships - **attack class:** [[wiki/Brainjacking|Brainjacking]]. - **clinical control loop:** [[wiki/Closed-Loop Neuromodulation|Closed-Loop Neuromodulation]]. - **collection:** [[collections/Neurotech|Neurotech]]. - **counterterrorism bridge:** [[wiki/Human CVE|Human CVE]] and [[collections/Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and the Intelligence Environment|Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and the Intelligence Environment]]. ## Sources / Provenance - Xinyu Jiang et al., [“Cybersecurity in neural interfaces: Survey and future trends”](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37883851/), *Computers in Biology and Medicine* 167 (2023), covering data-, permission-, and model-level attacks across forward decoding and backward neuromodulation or stimulation. - Laurie Pycroft et al., [“Brainjacking: Implant Security Issues in Invasive Neuromodulation”](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27184896/), *World Neurosurgery* 92 (2016). **As of:** 2026-09-23