# Regulatory Capture **Domain:** Governance / Political Economy / Regulation **Doc Type:** Canonical Concept Node **Maturity:** Developed **Related:** [[wiki/Infrastructure Capture|Infrastructure Capture]], [[wiki/Algorithmic State|Algorithmic State]], [[wiki/Continuity Access Inequality|Continuity Access Inequality]] --- ## Definition **Regulatory capture** occurs when regulation systematically serves the interests of regulated firms or other concentrated constituencies rather than the public purposes that justify the regulatory institution. Capture does not require a bribe or explicit conspiracy. It can emerge through information dependence, revolving personnel, agenda control, litigation asymmetry, underfunded oversight, technical complexity and repeated interaction between regulators and a small industry. ## Continuity-Sector Risks Continuity providers may control the expertise, logs, formats and migration tooling needed to evaluate them. A regulator that depends on vendor-defined metrics may enforce uptime while overlooking identity integrity, coercive consent, discriminatory service tiers or the practical impossibility of exit. Licensing can also entrench incumbents if compliance costs exclude independent custodians without reducing systemic risk. ## Indicators - standards reproduce proprietary architecture without necessity; - incident categories exclude harms that matter to continuants; - enforcement concentrates on small entrants while systemic incumbents receive negotiated delay; - public-interest representatives lack access to evidence or technical support; - portability exists on paper but exported states are unusable; - the regulated entity controls the regulator's test environment. ## Countermeasures Institutional responses include independent technical capacity, transparent rulemaking records, conflict-of-interest limits, adversarial testing, protected whistleblowing, rotating audits, public-interest standing and interoperable evidence requirements. No single measure eliminates capture; the goal is to prevent any one dependency from becoming decisive. ## Source - George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2, no. 1 (1971), 3–21. ## See Also [[wiki/Authoritarian Capture of Continuity Registries|Authoritarian Capture of Continuity Registries]] · [[wiki/Custodial Abuse and Neglect|Custodial Abuse and Neglect]] · [[wiki/Jurisdictional Arbitrage in Continuity Hosting|Jurisdictional Arbitrage in Continuity Hosting]] · [[wiki/Service-Level Governance|Service-Level Governance]]