# Testimonial Injustice **Domain:** Social epistemology **Doc Type:** Developed Concept Node **Maturity:** Developed **Collection:** [[collections/Gamification|Gamification Collection]] ## Definition **Testimonial injustice**, in Miranda Fricker's account, occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to assign a speaker less credibility than the speaker deserves. The harm is epistemic—the person is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower—and can also produce practical, legal, social, or psychological consequences. ## Significance The concept explains one way a targeted person can lose access to adjudication. If identity, diagnosis, status, or group stereotype automatically discounts testimony, additional evidence may be interpreted through the same credibility deficit. Coordinated ridicule and astroturfed consensus can intensify that process. Not every disagreement, error, or adverse credibility finding is testimonial injustice. The analysis requires attention to the credibility judgment, the prejudice or identity power shaping it, the evidence available, and the institutional procedure for correction. ## Sources - Miranda Fricker, [*Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*](https://academic.oup.com/book/32817) - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [Epistemic Injustice](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-injustice/) ## Routes [[wiki/Epistemic Injustice|Epistemic Injustice]] · [[wiki/Epistemic Injury|Epistemic Injury]] · [[wiki/Audience-of-One Attack|Audience-of-One Attack]] · [[wiki/Representational Due Process|Representational Due Process]]